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Boone: A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I

COMMENTS
A SOURCE OF REVENUE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
LEGAL SERVICES, PART I: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PLANS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND FLORIDA
ALLOWING THE USE OF CLIENTS' FUNDS HELD BY
ATTORNEYS IN NON-INTEREST-BEARING TRUST
ACCOUNTS TO SUPPORT PROGRAMS OF THE
ORGANIZED BAR
TAYLOR S. BOONE

A recent opinion of the Florida Supreme Court may be the harbinger of
plans in the United States to subsidize programs of the bar through the
use of clients' funds.' Upon application by the Florida Bar, the supreme
court of that state approved a voluntary plan, modeled in part on the plans
of other common law countries, whereby attorneys may place the noninterest-bearing trust funds of clients in savings accounts.2 The court recognized that there are often times' when the sums of money held by an
attorney in trust for a client are so small and are held for such a short
period that it is impractical and uneconomical to invest the funds and
account to the client for the earnings.' The court realized, however, that if
all these funds, which would otherwise remain idle in demand deposits,
were aggregated in a trust savings account and the expensive requirements
of allocating and accounting to each client were waived, significant interest
income could be earned.' Accordingly, the court directed that such interest
be remitted to the Florida Bar Foundation" which, in turn, would allocate
1. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
799-800 (Fla. 1978); 2 ABA DIscIPLINARY L. & PROC. ADVANCE SHEETS 1 (1978). Funds will be
used for numerous programs including improvement of lawyer disciplinary processes and
expansion of legal aid to the poor. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the
Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 811(Fla. 1978).
2. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
801, 803-07 (Fla. 1978).
3. See id. at 801, 806. Even an investment in a savings account might be impractical
and uneconomical. For example, the earnings that would accrue on $500 placed in a savings
account yielding six percent for a week would not pay for the attorney's accounting costs. The
earnings would amount to less than sixty cents, or $500 x 6% x 7 days/365 days. Such earnings
might not even cover the cost of accounting paper and adding machine tape, much less the
bookkeeping labor expense.
4. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
801-03 (Fla. 1978). An attorney would still incur expenses to maintain adequate accounting
procedures and records on the principal of clients' funds. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration
Rule 11.02(4)(c) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
5. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
807 (Fla. 1978).
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this revenue to various public interest programs that affect the legal pro7
fession." It must be emphasized that the plan is voluntary and does not
restrict an attorney's discretion to invest his clients' trust funds solely for
their benefit."
This comment will explain how clients' trust funds may be employed
legally to support programs of the organized bar. It will discuss the plans
in other common-law countries and analyze the scheme adopted in Florida.
BACKGROUND

A Reason for Change
The sufficiency of legal services in the United States remains an unresolved problem.' It is the duty of every attorney to make available to all
people adequate legal services;"' in fact, it has been implied that legal
service is a basic right of every citizen of the United States." Yet, there
are specific indications that Americans, especially those in the lower income brackets, have very limited access to attorneys. 2 Although numerous
experiments have been attempted to improve availability, legal services
remain woefully inadequate, especially with regard to the poor."3 Apparently, the common denominator to the solution of the problem of insufficient legal services is money." For example, the cost of furnishing adequate
legal service to the poor in the United States has been estimated to'be $500
million.'" Such financial resources are not currently available, either from
6. See id. at 805.
7. See id. at 804.
8. See id. at 807.
9. See Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 438, 438 (1965). See generally Cramton, Introduction: An International Comparison of Legal Services for the Poor, 10 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 205, 205-06 (1977).
10. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Canon 2; FLA. STAT. ANN., Code
of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2 (West Supp. 1968-1978); State Bar of Texas, Rules
and Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2 (1973). See generally Cheatham,
Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibilityof the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 438, 443-46 (1965).
11. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 132223, 1329-36 (1966). See generally Bamberger, The American Approach: Public Funding, Law
Reform, and Staff Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 207, 208 (1977).
12. See Bamberger, The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform, and Staff

Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 207, 208 n.6 (1977); Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal
Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 672-74 (1976).

13. See Bamberger, The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform, and Staff

Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 207, 208 (1977); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil
Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1323 (1966).
14. See Bamberger, The American Approach: Public Funding, Law Reform, and Staff
Attorneys, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 207, 208 (1977).
15. See id. at 208.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/7

2

Boone: A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I

19791

COMMENTS

private foundations or governments.'" One of the major objectives of the
plan adopted in Florida is to insure that funds to support adequate legal
services are forthcoming.'7
Attorney's Duties and Obligations When Managing a Client's Money
Before delving into the history of the use of clients' trust funds to support
legal programs, it is necessary to review the duties and obligations of an
attorney in managing a client's money. The Code of Professional Responsibility contains an ethical consideration recommending the separation of
client's funds from those of the attorney.'" The disciplinary rules of the
same canon specifically prohibit an attorney from commingling his funds
with those of his clients except in a few limited circumstances.'" Even
consent by the client that his funds may be commingled with his attorney's
does not relieve an attorney from the requirements of the Code.2"'
An attorney for various reasons will often hold money in trust for a
client.' Commonly, the attorney will hold the funds based upon some
agreement forming an express trust,22 and his duties as trustee will be
measured by the terms of the agreement.2 ' As trustee the attorney must
act in good faith and with due care, diligence, and skill, primarily to
safeguard the principal of the trust 2 and, secondarily, to keep the trust
16. See id. at 208; Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1322, 1323 (1966).
17. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
805, 811 (Fla. 1978).

18. ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 9-5. This same ethical consideration

has been adopted in Florida and Texas. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-5 (West Supp. 1968-1978); State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 9-5 (1973).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (A) (West Supp. 19681978). This disciplinary rule is identical to that promulgated by the American Bar Association

and adopted by the Texas Supreme Court. See ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 9-102(A); State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(A)
(1973).
20. See Archer v. State, 548 S.W.2d'71, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
21. For example, an attorney might hold the funds of a client by virtue of closing a
purchase of real estate, the settlement of an estate, the collection of a debt. or the receipt of
a judgment and award on behalf of the client.
22. An express trust can be created in a number of ways, one of which is simply an
agreement in writing. See Miller v. Donald, 235 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1950, writ refd n.r.e.); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-7 (Vernon 1960).
23. See, e.g., Jackson v. Templin, 66 §.W.2d 666, 670-71 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933
judgmt adopted); Hays v. Harter, 177 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1943, writ
ref'd); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duval, 96 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1936, writ ref'd).
24. See Vest v. Bialson, 293 S.W.2d 369, 379-80 (Mo. 1956); Finley v. Exchange Trust
Co., 80 P.2d 296, 303 (Okla. 1938). See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES

§§ 541-544 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
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funds properly invested."5 When the agreement gives no direction for the
investment of trust funds, the trustee is left to his own discretion within
statutory limits. A trustee is expected to invest the funds under his control as soon as practical, 7 unless such funds are to be delivered presently
to the beneficiaries or the trustor 5 or unless the sum is too small to be
invested economically." Thus, a trustee's duty to invest does not require
investment when it is apparent that any investment will yield a loss.:", For
example, if an attorney knew that his administrative costs for processing
any investment of a small trust would exceed the yield, :" his only prudent
course of action would be to place the money in a non-interest-bearing
2
demand account.3
CLIENTS' TRUST FUNDS IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In a numer of jurisdictions throughout the world, clients' trust funds
which are not specifically held for investment by an attorney for his clients
are invested for the benefit of public legal programs." The systems developed in each country are different, but the end result is the same: the use
of clients' funds without the clients' ever realizing any direct benefit. The
following discussion will review and compare the systems or plans that
have been enacted in Australia, Canada, and the Republic of South Africa.
Australia

No single Australian statute provides nationally for the use of interest
on trust accounts. Instead, five of the states in Australia have separate
25. See, e.g., Title Guarantee*& Trust Co. v. Bedford, 5 A.2d 852, 854 (Conn. 1939);
Kimball v. Reding, 31 N.H. 352, '373-74 (1855); Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 80 P.2d 296,
303 (Okla. 1938). See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 541-544 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
26. See generally TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-46A (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979)
(trustee may invest as would ordinary; prudent man in such investments as bonds, debentures, stock, investment trusts and mutual funds).
27. See Moore v. Sanders, 106 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, no
writ).
28. See Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 61 A.2d 297, 298 (N.J. Ch. 1948), modified
on other grounds, 70 A.2d 784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949), rev'd in part, aff'd in part,
77 A.2d 219 (N.J. 1950).
29. See Knowlton v. Bradley, 17 N.H. 458, 459 (1845).
30. Cf. State ex rel. Torrence v. Davidson, 92 N.C. 408, 410-11 (1885) (trustee should
enforce choses in action, debts, and demands unless enforcement would cause loss).
31. Generally, a trustee is entitled to be reimbursed for administrative or operating
expenses incurred in carrying out the trust. See, e.g., Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus,
113 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-36 (1881); Van Gemert
v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
7425b-4(K) (Vernon 1973) & art. 7425b-36 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
32. See In re 'Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
801 (Fla. 1978).
33. See id. at 803.
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statutes: Victoria,"4 New South Wales,'' South Australia," Queensland,37
and the Australian Capital Territory. 1 The Australian state of Victoria
was the first state to adopt a system whereby interest on certain trust
accounts would be dedicated to support a Solicitors' Guarantee Fund.'
Although the possibility of using interest on clients' trust funds to support
the Guarantee Fund first surfaced in 1952,1" not until 1963 did the Victorian Parliament seriously consider this source of income." Finally, in
1964 when the Guarantee Fund could no longer service all the claims, the
opposition of the banks was overcome. 2 Within a- few years after enactment, this source of revenue became more than sufficient to support the
Solicitors' Guarantee Fund.A As a consequence of the availability of funds,
the Law Foundation was created for the purpose, in part, of improving the
practice of law in Victoria." Other Australian states followed Victoria's
lead and soon enacted similar statutes."
Although the statutes of four Australian states are not totally uniform,
they are similar enough to form a common scheme that may be referred
to as the "Australian Plan."'" The plan, except in the state of South Aus-

34. See Legal Profession Practice Act, VIcT. STAT. No. 6291, § 40 (1958), as amended by
Acts Vict. No. 7226, sec. 6, at 443 (1964), as amended by Acts Vict. No. 8954, sec. 40 (1976).
35. See Legal Practitioners Act, 1898-1954, PuB. AcTs N.S.W. No. 22, § 42 (1960), as
amended by Stat. N.S.W. No. 29, sec. 7(b) (1967).
36. See Legal Practitioners Act, 1936-1972, PUB. GEN. Acrs S. Ausm. §§ 22-24d (1978).
37. See Legal Assistance Act, Queensl. Stat. No. 67, sec. 10, at 908-10 (1965), as
amended by Queensl. Stat. No. 46, sec. 3 (1970).
38. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the'Florida Bar, 356 So.'2d 799,
803 n.25 (Fla. 1978).
39. See Dawson, The Solicitors' Guarantee Fund, 49 LAw INST. J. 16, 17-18 (1975). See
generally Legal Profession Practice (Amendment) Act, Acts Vict. No. 7226, sec. 6(2) at 43.45
(1964), as amended by Acts Vict. No. 8954, sec. 40 (1976). The Solicitors' Guarantee Fund is
comparable to the clients' security funds found in many states of the United States whereby
clients may be reimbursed for all or a portion of the pecuniary losses they suffer because of
dishonest acts of their attorneys. See generally Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund Maintains Bar's Integrity, 44 FLA. B.J. 130, 130 (1970); Wray, A New Way to Serve Our Clients:
The Clients' Security Fund, 35 Tax. B.J. 1023, 1023 (1972).
40. See Dawson, The Solicitors' Guarantee Fund, 49 LAw INST. J. 16, 17 (1975).
41. See id. at 17.
42. See id. at 17.
43. See id. at 17-18. See generally Legal Profession Practice Act, VicT. STAT. No. 6291,
§§ 52-73 (1958), as amended by Acts Vict. No. 7226 secs. 8-14 (1964) (creating and funding
Solicitors' Guarantee Fund).
44. See generally Legal Profession Practice (Victoria Law Foundation) Act, Acts Vict.
No. 7539 (1967) (creating Victoria Law Foundation).
45. See Legal Practitioners Act, 1898-1954, PUB. AcTs N.S.W. No. 22, § 42 (1960), as
amended by Stat. N.S.W. No. 29, sec. 7(b) (1967).(New South Wales); Legal Assistance Act,
Queensl. Stat. No. 67, sec. 10, at 908 (1965), as amended by Queensl. Stat. No. 46, sec. 3
(1970) (Queensland); Legal Practitioners Act, 1936-1972, PuB. GEN. Acrs S. AusTL. §§ 22-24d
(1978) (South Australia).
46. See Appendix I, A Comparison of the Key Provisions of the Statutes Relating to
Solicitors' Trust Accounts in the Australian States of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia,
and New South Wales.
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tralia, requires every solicitor to transfer to the applicable legal society or
institute an average of between one-third and two-thirds of the lowest
balance of the principal of his trust banking account during the preceding
statutory period."1 The money to be transferred, however, does not include
funds which are to be invested according to an arrangement with the
client.4" Once transferred, the principal may generally be withdrawn upon
demand by the solicitor. ' The plan further requires that all funds not
withdrawn be invested by the applicable law society, with the interest
earned accruing to the benefit of a Solicitors' Guarantee Fund and another fund which provides, in part, for legal assistance. "' Generally, if
the balance of a solicitor's trust bank account falls below a specified
sum, the solicitor is not required to transfer funds to the society.' Two of
the Australian states specifically exempt both the solicitor and the legal
society from legal or equitable actions brought by persons as a result of
the solicitor's compliance with the applicable statute. 2
Although accounting problems with the Australian Plan were at first
encountered,' those individuals associated with the various schemes have
reported favorable results." Since the Australian Constitution contains no
due process clause, ' no actions have arisen concerning unjust deprivation
of property, and no litigation challenging the various statutes of the plan
on other grounds appears to have been reported.
47. See Appendix I, § 2. Generally, all money received by a solicitor for or on behalf of
another person is to be placed in a trust bank account. See Appendix I, § 1. The following
excerpt from the Queensland statutes is an example of statutes requiring solicitors to transfer
the corpus of their trust bank accounts.
(2)
. . . every solicitor shall out of the moneys in his trust bank account (a) not later than twenty days after the commencing date deposit with the
Society a sum which is not less than two-thirds of the amount which was the
lowest balance in his trust bank account on any day during the period of twelve
months ending on and including the day immediately preceding the commencing date (herein referred to as "the initial period") or, where he maintains more
than one trust bank account, a sum which is not less than two-thirds of the
lowest aggregate on any day during the initial period of the balances in his trust
bank accounts, excluding any accounts that were maintained for the exclusive
benefit of a specific person or specific persons;
Legal Assistance Act, Queensl. Stat. No. 67, sec. 10(2)(a) at 908 (1965), as amended by
Queensl. Stat. No. 46, sec. 3(c) (1970).
48. See Appendix I, § 3.
49. See Appendix I, § 4.
50. See Appendix I, § 5.
51. See Appendix 1, § 6. The specified sum varies among the states from 1,500 fto 3,000£
including those funds already transferred to the society. See Appendix I, § 6.
52. The two states are Queensland and South Australia. See Appendix I, § 7.
53. See Dawson, The Solicitors' GuaranteeFund, 49 LAW INST. J. 16, 18 (1975).
54. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
803 (Fla. 1978).
55. See 2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTrruTIONS OF NATIONS 32 (rev. 3d ed. 1966).
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Canada
The law societies in the various Canadian provinces have also turned to
the trust funds of clients as a source for support of legal programs.5 6 Although many of the provinces of Canada did not enact legislation authorizing the use of clients' trust funds for support of legal programs until the
1970's,"7 most Canadian governments, as well as the legal community
within the remainder of the Commonwealth, had taken notice in the early
1960's of the large amounts of interest lost on clients' trust funds left in
non-interest-bearing acccounts, or demand deposits. 51 Throughout the

Commonwealth it was well-recognized that it would be impractical and
too expensive for attorneys to account to each client for interest that could
have been earned on the short-term trusts."5 As a consequence, attorneys
placed such trusts in non-interest-bearing accounts, 0 unless otherwise directed by the client."' Attorneys in many of the Canadian provinces, however, realized that if all of the non-interest-bearing trusts of each attorney
or firm were consolidated into one account for each attorney or firm, a
minimum average sum would remain constant despite the continual activity of deposits and withdrawals. 2 This constant sum, in turn, was recog56. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADVOCATE 264, 264 (1969) ("an ingenious
plan for endowing a foundation to which we can all contribute without it costing us a cent").
57. See Act to amend the Legal Professions Act, B.C. Stat. c.15, sec. 16, § 71 1, at 191
(1969) (amending B.C. REV. STAT. c.214, § 71 (1960)) (British Columbia-first province to
enact change); Act to Amend the Barristers and Solicitors Act, N.S. Stat. c. 22, sec. 2, §§
47-50, at 173-77 (1976) (amending N.S. REV. STAT. c.18 (1967)) (Nova Scotia-most recent
province to enact change). Appendix II contains a summary of those statutes in Canadian
provinces enacting programs authorizing the use of clients' trust funds to support legal programs. See Appendix 11, Comparison of the Key Provisions of the Statutes Relating to Solicitors' Trust Accounts in the Canadian Provinces of Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, Prince Edwards Island, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. It is reported that the
province of New Brunswick has also enacted such a statute. See In re Interest on Trust
Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 803 n.25 (Fla. 1978).
58. See Brown v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1964 3 All E.R. 119, 121-22 (H.L.); McAfee v. Law Society, 57 D.L.R. 3d 730, 733 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1975). See generally Cunningham,
Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients' Trusts Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145 (1967).
59. See Brown v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1964] 3 All E.R. 119, 122 (H.L.); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrrY's L.J. 149, 149 (1972). See generally
In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 1978)
(problem also recognized in Florida); Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients'
Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145 (1967).
60. See materials cited note 59 supra.
61. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADVOCATE 264, 264 (1969). See generally In
re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 1978);
Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients' Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145
(1967); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrry's L.J. 149, 149 (1972). An
attorney-trustee could validly assume no client would direct his short-term trust funds to be
invested if he knew that his attorney's fees would thereby be increased in excess of the
earnings. Cf. State ex rel. Torrence v. Davidson, 92 N.C. 408, 410-11(1885) (trustee should
enforce choses in action, debts, and demands unless enforcement would cause loss).
62. See Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors'Mixed Clients' Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE
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nized as a base from which interest income could be generated and economically calculated. 3
As a result of these discoveries, law societies throughout Canada in the
late 1960's began to make efforts to enact legislation whereby these noninterest-bearing trusts could be put to use.' Initially, banks, unlike trust
companies, did not welcome the legislation since the banks would no longer
have free use of funds in the numerous non-interest-bearing trust accounts."3 The banks were finally appeased, however, when legal societies
agreed that interest would have to be paid only on the designated minimum or average balance of each attorney's or firm's trust savings account."6 Although the agreement for the payment of interest solely on a
designated minimum balance was not included in the applicable statutes
of the provinces, 7 except those of Saskatchewan,"6 the use of the desigcommon.6
nated average or minimum balance 'is
The statutes concerning lawyers' trust accounts enacted in the various
provinces of Canada are almost identical7 ' and may be referred to as the
"Canadian Plan." Unlike the Australian Plan, the procedure used in Canada"does not require any of the corpus of the trust to be transferred to the
law society.7' In Canada the solicitor retains possession and control of the
entire trust.72 All funds held for or on behalf of a client and not immedi145, 145 (1967); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrr'sL.J. 149, 149-51
(1972). See generally Robertson, The Law Foundation,27 ADVOCATE 264, 264 (1969).
63. See materials cited note 62 supra.
64. See Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients' Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE
145, 145 (1967) (British Columbia); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20
CHrrry's L.J. 149, 150-51 (1972) (Alberta).
65. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADVOCATE 264, 264 (1969).
66. See id. at 264.
67. See Appendix II, § 3.
68. See Appendix II, n.33.
69. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts; a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
803 (Fla. 1978). See generally Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients' Trust
Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145 (1967) (Victoria); Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27
ADVOCATE 264, 264 (1969) (British Columbia); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 20 CHrrry's L.J. 149, 151 (1972) (Alberta).
70. See Appendix II. The statutes of the Australian states are not as similar as are the
statutes in the provinces of Canada. Compare Act to Amend the Law Society Act, Ont. Stat.
c.49, sec. 3 (1973) (amending ONT. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 51 (1970)) (Ontario, Canada) and Legal
Profession Amendment Act, Alta. Stat. c. 114, sec. 7 (1972) (amending ALTA. REV. STAT. c.203
(1970)) (Alberta, Canada) with Legal Profession Practice (Amendment) Act, Acts Vict. No.
7226, sec. 6 (1964), as amended by Acts Vict. No. 8954, sec. 40 (1976) (amending VIcr. STAT.
No. 6291, § 40 (1958)) (Victoria, Australia) and Legal Assistance Act, Queensl. Stat. No. 67,
sec. 10 (1965), as amended by Queensl. Stat. No. 46, sec. 3(c) (1970) (Queensland, Australia).
71. Compare Appendix I, § 2 (Australian Plan requiring transfer of corpus) with Appendix H, §§ 3 & 4 (Canadian Plan requiring corpus to be placed in trust account and only
interest transferred).
72. See Appendix II, § 3. See generally Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed
Clients' Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145 (1967) (Victoria); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrry's L.J. 149, 149-51 (1972) (Alberta).
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ately invested are to be placed in an interest-bearing trust account,' except in Saskatchewan where trust funds need not be so placed if the balance of the solicitor's trust account drops below $5,000.1 All interest
earned on the funds placed in the interest-bearing account is to be remitted
to the law foundation, 5 unless there is a written agreement between the
solicitor and his client concerning the disposition of such interest or unless
the client directs that his funds be held in a separate account and not be
deposited in the attorney's trust savings account."
Under the Canadian Plan, solicitors in all but one of the provinces are
not required to advise their clients that they have a right to earn interest
on their trust funds and that such funds Will, otherwise, be invested for
the benefit of the law society." Although this, is contrary to any notion of
due process recognized in the United States,"6 Canadian citizens are not
protected by such a due process guarantee. 7 Furthermore, under the Canadian Plan, solicitors complying with the relevant statutes cannot incur any
liability to their clients, either as solicitors or as trustees, for failing to
account to them for the interest on their trust funds that accrues to the
law society."' Although participation in the Canadian Plan is now mandatory in all the applicable provinces," until 1974 solicitors in British Columbia were not required to place all non-interest-bearing trust funds in ac73. See Appendix II, § 3.
74. See Act to amend The Legal Profession Act, Sask. Stat. c. 55, sec. 4, §§ (IA) - (1C),
at 204-05 (1973) (amending SASK. REV. STAT. c. 301, § 44 (1965), as amended by Sask. Stat.
c.22, sec. 3 (1971)).
75. See Appendix II, § 4. In Manitoba, however, the funds are remitted to the Minister
of Finance. Act to Amend the Law Society Act, Man. Stat. c.55, sec. 3, § 30.2(2), at 322
(1972) (amending MAN. REV. STAT. c.L100, § 30 (1970)).
76. See Appendix II, § 5.
77. See Apppendix II, § 5. In Nova Scotia, however, a lawyer who believes that his
client's funds will be on deposit for more than thirty days has a duty to inform his client of
his right to earn interest on such funds. See Act to Amend the Barristers and Solicitors Act,
N.S. Stat. c.22, sec. 2, § 50(3), at 177 (1976).
78. It is well-settled in the United States that a government cannot take private property
without affording the owner both procedural and substantive due process. See, e.g., Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971) (substantive); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (procedural); Keating v. State ex rel. Ausebel, 173
So. 2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1965) (substantive and procedural). See generally U.S. CONST. amends.
V & XIV.
79. See 4 A. PEASLEE, CONSTrrTIONS OF NATONS 207 (rev. 3d ed. 1970). Although Canada
enacted a bill of rights in 1960 recognizing the right of a person not to be deprived of property
without due process of law, that bill of rights is not a guarantee but serves only as an influence
on Parliament. See id. at 207, 237.
80. See Appendix II, § 6.
81. See Appendix II, § 3. The province of Saskatchewan provides one exception. When
the sum of trust funds of all clients falls below $5,000, an attorney need not deposit the funds
in an interest-bearing account. See Act to amend the Legal Profession Act, Sask. Stat. c.55,
sec. 4, 93 (A) - (C), at 204-05 (1973) (amending SASK. REv. STAT. c.301, § 44 (1965), as
amended by Sask. Stat. c.22, sec. 3 (1971)).
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counts to earn interest on behalf of the law society."
The same acts which authorized the use of clients' general trust funds
for the benefit of legal programs also created the law foundations in each
of the participating provinces except Manitoba.". All the foundations were
created with the objective of using the revenue generated from clients'
trust funds for legal education, research, and legal aid to the public. Onehalf of the provinces also authorized the use of this revenue for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of law libraries, 8 and other provinces dedicated revenue for the reform of laws."6 Apparently, however,the
use of the funds was a controversial issue in some of the provinces, eliciting
queries of possible conflicts of interest and ventures into areas which were
believed to be the, responsibility of government. 7 Concern was expressed
by some attorneys that projects such as creation, operation, and maintenance of libraries were questionable as being programs primarily benefit8
ing "lawyers as a class," thereby creating a possible conflict of interest.1
Some legal scholars concluded that legal aid was the responsibility of the
Canadian governments, and not the law societies, whereas other scholars
found that the most important use of the funds by the law societies was
the support of legal aid.89
The Canadian Plan is apparently a success as no disabling problems,
either legal or administrative, have been reported. 0 In fact, the authority
of one province's law society to promulgate additional rules concerning
solicitors' trust accounts has been upheld in court."' Furthermore, in British Columbia, the Law Foundation is receiving over two million dollars
annually from earnings on clients' trust funds maintained by attorneys, 2
82. See McAfee v. Law Society, 57 D.L.R. 3d 730, 734 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1975); Act to amend
the Legal Professions Act, B.C. Stat. c.49, sec. 2 (a)(1)(k), at 266 (1974) (amending B.C.
REV. STAT. c.214, § 37 (1960), as amended by B.C. Stat. c. 15, sec. 6 (1969)). Prior to enactment of the statutory requirement of participation, the law society of British Columbia
adopted rules requiring solicitors' participation for trust accounts with balances exceeding
$5,000. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
804 (Fla. 1978).

83. See Appendix II, § 1.
84. See Appendix II, § 2.
85. See Appendix II, § 2.

86. See Appendix II, § 2.
87. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADVocATE 264, 265 (1969); Sadownik,
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrrY's L.J. 149, 150 (1972).
88. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 AnvocAT 264, 265 (1969).
89. Compare Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADvocATE 264, 265 (1969) ("law reform
and legal aid, are properly the responsibility of the provincial government") with Sadownik,
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrrm's L.J. 149, 150-51 (1972) (legal aid is most
important project of law society).
90. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
803-04 (Fla. 1978).
91. See McAfee v. Law Society, 57 D.L.R. 3d 730, 734-35 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1975).

92. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,

804 (Fla. 1978) (citing Law Foundation of British Columbia, Annual Report for the fiscal year
ending April 30, 1976)).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/7

10

Boone: A Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I

1979]

COMMENTS

a substantial increase from the first year of the plan when it was voluntary.9 '
Africa
Although it has been reported that the countries of South-West Africa,
Rhodesia, and the Republic of South Africa have interest-bearing trust
plans,"' only the system developed in the Republic of South Africa will be
reviewed. The law of trusts in South Africa is unlike the common-law
structure of trusts found in England and different from the fiduciary systems of civil-law countries, in which "the words 'trust' and 'trustee' are
not found in law."5 In South Africa the relationship between an attorney,
as trustee, and his client, as trustor or beneficiary, "is one of debtor and
creditor."" Accordingly, unlike a common-law country such as England,
the client has "no right to follow trust assets" if the attorney has appropriated or misused them;97 in fact, the client is relegated to the same status
as an unsecured creditor.9 9 Although an attorney has a duty to invest his
clients' trust funds under the common-law in South Africa," until 1964
once funds were placed in a trust savings account, they could only be
withdrawn to meet the obligations of the trust.90 Finally, in 1964 statutes
were passed permitting the withdrawal of funds for the purpose of investment.""
These same statutes also provide for what may be called the "South
African Plan."''9 Unlike both the Australian and Canadian plans, the system in South Africa is not mandatory.0 3 An attorney need not place his
clients' funds in his trust savings account, even if he is not going to invest
the funds.9 4 In fact, very little incentive exists for an attorney to maintain
93. In the first year only $50,000 was produced. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a
Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 804 (Fla. 1978).
94. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
803 n.25 (Fla. 1978).
95. Silberberg, Book Review, 1977 1 RHODESIAN L.J. 98, 98 (T. HONOR9, THE SoUTm
AFRICAN LAW OF TRUSTS).

96. Id. at 98.
97. See id. at 98.
98. See id. at 98.
99. See T. HONoRS, THE SouT AFRICAN LAW OF TRusTs 217 (2d ed. 1976).
100. See id. at 244.
101. See id. at 245. See generally Attorneys, Notaries, and Conveyancers Admission
Act of 1934, STAT. OF REP. S. AFR. § 33(2), at 165(2) (1978).
102. See generally Attorneys, Notaries, and Conveyancers Admission Act of 1934, STAT.
OF REP. S. Arn. § 33 (1978).
103. See id. § 33(2)(a), at 165(2).
104. See T. HONORA, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRusTs 245 (2d ed. 1976). It may be
argued, however, that an attorney has a duty to place uninvested funds in a savings trust
account because the client or his beneficiaries have a possible interest in the soundness of
the equivalent of a clients' security fund. See id. at 245. See generally Attorneys' Admission
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large deposits in trust savings accounts, because all interest accruing on
the principal must be remitted to the equivalent of a clients' security
fund.' 5 This provision, whereby interest must be remitted to the clients'
security fund, is the sole basis of the South African Plan, and in light of
its limited scope, bar associations in the United States are unlikely to use
this plan as a model for their proposals of trusts savings accounts.
THE FLORIDA PLAN

Background
The March, 1978 decision of the Florida Supreme Court authorizing
attorneys to invest clients' non-interest-bearing trust funds for the benefit
of legal programs was the culmination of work started by the Florida Bar
in 1971.106 The plan adopted by the Florida court required the amendment
of Florida's Integration Rule'07 and the Code of Professional Conduct."",
Rule 11.02(4) of the Integration Rule is specifically directed to duties of
an attorney concerning money or other property entrusted to him by a
9
client. 1"
The rule, in part, provides that money held by an attorney for a
client must be used only for the purposes designated by the client, that
such money is not subject to setoff for the attorney's fees, and that refusal
to account for and deliver to the client his money upon demand constitutes
conversion."50 The rule further requires attorneys to maintain detailed accounting records as may be requested by the bar"' and to comply with
Disciplinary Rule 9-102 of the Florida Code of Professional ResponsibilAmendment and Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Act of 1941, STAT. OF REP. S. AFR. §§ 141 (1978) (creating a clients' security fund).

105. See Attorneys, Notaries, and Conveyancers Admission Act of 1934, STAT. OF REP.
S. AFR. § 33(3), at 162(2)-(3) (1978). See generally T. HONOR9, THE SouTH AnicAN LAW OF

TRusTs 245 (2d ed. 1976).

106. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
800 (Fla. 1978).
107. Integration is the "act of organizing the bar of a state into an association, member-

ship in which is a condition precedent to the right to practice law." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
946 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See, e.g., In re Integrating the Bar, 259 S.W. 2d 144, 145 (Ark. 1953);
In re Integration of State Bar, 95 P.2d 113, 114 (Okla. 1939); Integration of Bar Case, 11
N.W.2d 604, 608 (Wis. 1943).
108. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
807-11 (Fla. 1978). Under the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the discipline of attorneys. See FiA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
110. See id. The accounting requirements do not appear onerous, but the failure to

comply with them can result in an attorney being audited at his expense by the Florida Bar.
See id. Failure to comply with accounting requirements could even lead to disciplinary

actions. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
801 (Fla. 1978). It appears that these accounting procedures are specifically aimed at a
problem in Florida; approximately 56% of all the disciplinary actions against attorneys in
Florida from 1970 to 1977 pertained to problems with trust accounts. See id. at 801 n.17.
111. See FuA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(b),(c) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
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ity.112 Disciplinary Rule 9-102" prohibits an attorney from commingling a
client's funds with his own except in two circumstances"' and requires an
attorney to perform specific functions concerning the client's property." '
These regulations imposed upon attorneys have been interpreted by the
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to prohibit an attorney from investing and deriving income from a
client's funds, even if for the purpose of defraying operating expenses,
unless the client has specifically authorized such a procedure.",
The same circumstances that led to the creation of the Australian and
Canadian plans" 7 also led to the action by the Florida Bar-the need for
money to support legal programs and a readily available source from which
to derive such funds. The initial motive of the Florida Bar in proposing the
use of non-interest-bearing trusts of clients was to develop a revenue source
for the clients' security fund, and not until 1977 did the bar seek'funding
for other legal programs."" Like the legal societies and courts of the Commonwealth,"' the Florida Bar was aware that substantial sums of clients'
trust funds were left idle in demand deposits. 2t As the Florida Supreme
Court recognized, when relatively small, short-term trusts are placed with
attorneys, it is impractical for attorneys to invest clients' funds and adequately report earnings, even if only for deposits in savings accounts.''
112. See id. § (4)(a),(b).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (West Supp. 19681978). This disciplinary rule is identical to that of the American Bar Association and that of
Texas. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1968); State Bar of Texas,

Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (1973).
114. An attorney may deposit funds of the client in his own account to pay bank charges
on the client's account, and if the client's funds belong in part to the attorney, those funds
may be withdrawn when due unless disputed by the client. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(A) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
115. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(B) (West Supp.
1968-1978). One of the functions is that the attorney must promptly pay his client the funds
on deposit upon the client's request. See id. DR 9-102(B)(4).
116. See 1 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSONAL ETICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, Nos. 545 (1962) &
991 (1967).
117. See notes 40-42 & 56 supra and accompanying text.
118. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
804 n.32 (Fla. 1978).
119. See Brown v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [19641 3 All E.R. 119, 122 (H.L.); Cunningham, Interest on Solicitors' Mixed Clients' Trust Accounts, 25 ADVOCATE 145, 145 (1967);
Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrrv's L.J. 149, 149 (1972).
120. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
801 (Fla. 1978). According to the opponents of the bar's proposal, this was a conclusion
reached without support. See id. at 805.
121. See id. at 801-02. Even if an attorney were to place all his clients' small trusts in
one savings account, the problem of allocating interest would require an excessive amount of
time and very close coordination with the bank. See id. at 801 n.18; Brown v. Inland Revenue
Comm'rs, [19641 3 All E.R. 119, 122 (H.L.); Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
20 CHrrry's L.J.. 149, 149 (1972). The problems faced by a law firm with three hundred
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Such recognition by the court, however, did not mean that an attorney was
no longer obligated to use his discretion in determining whether to invest

his clients' funds strictly for their benefit.'

Consequently, if a trust was

obviously of adequate size and duration to be invested economically for the
benefit of the client, an attorney placing all of the clients' funds in accounts for the benefit of the bar's programs would be in breach of his
fiduciary duty.' When, however, a number of small accounts cannot be
economically invested, they can be aggregated, and without the requirements of accounting to each client the net income will be substantial.' It
is this interest income that the Bar of Florida sought to dedicate to public
legal programs, the clients' security fund, and other bar-related needs.,
Obstacles to the Florida Plan
The most significant obstacles to the implementation of.the Florida
Plan were the federal and state banking regulations.' Federal statutes and
regulations prohibit the payment of interest upon any demand or checking
account.' 7 As a consequence, the Florida Bar was limited to using savings
clients, all of whom at one time or another during the year place small sums of money in the
firm's trust, could be staggering. For example, on a random morning 22 clients could have
deposits with the firm, but by that evening eight clients could have withdrawn some or all of
their funds and 15 clients could have placed or added funds. The accounting problems and
the problems of coordination with the bank in determining which clients were to be credited
with interest that day and on what balance would probably be more than a headache for most
firms.
A further problem would be the actual payment of interest to the client withdrawing all
his funds, when banks make interest payments on a quarterly basis. The futility of requiring
every trust to be deposited in savings accounts is more readily apparent when one recognizes
that the interest earned on some trusts might not even pay for the postage to mail the
earnings. If, for some reason, an attorney held $100 for a client for seven days and assuming
a six percent return on a savings account, the interest earned would not even amount to 12
cents ($100 x 6% x 7 days/365 days).
122. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 779,
807 (Fla. 1978).
123. It is the duty of the trustee to invest productively the funds of the trust unless the
trust money is to be applied immediately or within a short time. See Langford v. Shamburger,
417 S.W.2d 438, 444-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ refid n.r.e.); Moore v. Sanders, 106 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, no writ). Failure to fulfill this
duty is a breach of trust. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. McGuire, 184 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir.
1950); Gibson County v. Fourth & First Nat'l Bank, 96 S.W.2d 184, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1936); Republic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bruce, 130 Tex. 136, 140, 105 S.W.2d 882, 885
(1937).
124. If, for example, the average balance of all the small accounts for an attorney totalled
$10,000, a six percent interest rate would yield a sum of $600 during a period of one year.
125. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
804-05 (Fla. 1978).
126. See id. at 801-02.
127. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 217.2(a) (1978) (part of Regulation Q of
Federal Reserve Board); id. § 329.2(a) (part of regulations promulgated by Federal Deposit
Insurance Cooperation). Interest payments are prohibited on demand deposits because banks
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accounts. Use of savings accounts also presented a problem, as both federal
and state regulations inhibited the withdrawal of funds upon demand by
the depositor.'1 Banks are given the right to require at least a thirty-day
notice before funds are withdrawn, in part or in full. 2 ' This right to notice
created a potential conflict for an attorney in Florida because under the
Florida Integration Rule and the Code of Professional Responsibility, an
attorney must repay the funds entrusted to him upon demand of his
client.' Furthermore, savings accounts, whether with banks or savings
and loan associations, cannot be drawn upon by anyone other than the
depositor,' subject to a few exceptions. 3 ' Accordingly, federal regulations
prohibit savings deposits from being subject to negotiable orders of withdrawals (NOW),' s except in seven northeastern states.' A NOW account
is a hybrid of the traditional checking account, also known as a demand
account,' s and the traditional savings account.' The NOW account is
in competing for demand deposits would probably reduce reserve levels to a point such that
the banks could not cover an unexpected rise in withdrawals. See Comment, The Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Checking Accounts" for Savings Banks?, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 471, 479 (1973). Consequently, failure to pay upon demand defeats
the very purpose of demand deposits and subjects the bank and all demand depositors to a
substantial risk if there is a sudden run on the bank. Id. at 479.
128. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 654.02 (West 1966); 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(2)(1978).
129. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 654.02 (West 1966); (sixty-day notice may be required); 12
C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(2)(1978) (thirty-day notice may be required).
130. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(2)(1978)(bank has right to thirty-day notice) and FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 654.02 (West 1966) (bank has right to sixty-day notice) with FLA. STAT. ANN.,
Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978) (attorney must pay upon client's demand)
and FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102 (B)(4) (West Supp. 19681978) (attorney must pay upon client's demand).
131. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.5(c)(1), 329.5(c)(1) & 545.4-1(a)(1)(1978).
132. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.5(c)(1)(i)-(vii), 329.5(c)(1)(i)-(vi) & 545.4-1(a)(3)(1978), as
amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 5340 (1978). Interest earned on the savings deposit may be paid to
a third party by the bank upon written instruction from the depositor. See 12 C.F.R. §
217.5(c)(1)(vi) (1978).
133. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(Supp. V 1975), as amended by State Taxation of Depositories Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) (adding Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Maine, and Vermont) and Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3712 (1978) (adding New York).
134. The seven states exempted by these same laws are: Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Maine, Vermont, New York, and New Hampshire. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
(Supp. V 1975), as amended by State Taxation of Depositories Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) and Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3712 (1978). A program similar to NOW
accounts in banks is authorized for federal credit unions. See 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (1978), as
amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 5359 (1978) (delay of effective date to March 8, 1978). Federal credit
unions may provide their members with share drafts which may be withdrawn from share
draft accounts in negotiable or non-negotiable form. Id. § 701.34(a) & (b). The Florida Bar
did not request the right to place client trust funds in credit unions of which attorneys are
members. See generally In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356
So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
135. The term check is defined as "any draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand."
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similar to a checking account because a draft drawn on a NOW account is
negotiable and may be transferred freely to third parties. 137 Negotiable
orders of withdrawal are similar in appearance and legal standing to a
check and move through the banking and financial system as would any
check drawn on a demand deposit.'3 ' Unlike demand deposits, however,
NOW accounts earn interest and in that respect resemble savings accounts.' 3' Despite the inability of financial institutions in Florida to use
NOW accounts,' 4' the Florida Supreme Court was able to develop a plan
that on its face does not create a conflict for attorneys.'
The Plan Adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
The plan adopted by the Florida Supreme Court is a voluntary program. "' 2 Any attorney, however, who does elect to participate in the program must, at his discretion, invest his client's funds for the benefit of the
client "when appropriate.""

3

The earnings of funds not invested for the

benefit of clients are to be remitted to the Florida Bar Foundation, Inc.,'"
12 C.F.R. § 210.2(b)(1978). It is therefore logical that any account on which a person could
draw drafts would be called a checking account. Furthermore, since the checks must be paid
on demand, the checking account is also called a demand account.
136. See Kaplan, Federal Legislative and Regulatory Treatment of NOW Accounts, 91
BANKING L.J. 439, 449-54 (1974); Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW)
Account: "Checking Accounts"for Savings Banks?, 14 B.C. INDUs. & CoM. L. REv. 471, 49299 (1973).
137. See Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account: "Checking
Accounts" for Savings Banks?, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rav. 471, 472 (1973).
138. See Kaplan, Federal Legislative and Regulatory Treatment of NOW Accounts, 91
BANKING L.J. 439, 449-54(1974); Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW)
Account: "Checking Accounts" for Savings Banks?, 14 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. Rav. 471, 49299 (1973).
139. Savings accounts subject to negotiable orders of withdrawal may earn up to five
percent interest. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.7(c), 329.6(c), 329.7 (b)(1)(ii); 43 Fed. Reg. 46846 (1978)
(to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 526.8(a)).
140. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(Supp. V 1975), as amended by State Taxation of Depositories Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) and Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3712
(1978) (all but seven states prohibited from using NOW accounts).
141. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
809-11 (Fla. 1978).
142. See id. at 809. The proposal by the bar, however, included a caveat that the program
would remain voluntary only until federal laws and regulations were amended to allow either
interest to be paid on checking accounts or negotiable orders of withdrawals to be drawn on
savings accounts in Florida. See id. at 804.
143. Id. at 807. Although the words "when appropriate" are not defined in the court's
opinion, it is a general rule that a trustee must invest the funds he holds in trust when such
funds are not to be repaid within a very short time. See Langford v. Shamburger, 417 S.W.2d
438, 444-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Sanders, 106
S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, no writ).
144. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
807, 810 (Fla. 1978). The Foundation was authorized by article XII of the Integration Rule.
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which will allocate the funds to support various programs of the bar, the
foundation, and Florida Legal Services, Inc."' The programs of these three
entities have the following purposes:
(a) to provide legal aid to the poor;
(b) to provide for the adequate delivery of legal services to all members of
the public;
(c) to augment the clients' security fund with a view toward full reimbursement;
(d) to fund a more expeditious and efficient grievance mechanism;
(e) to provide student loans;
(f) to improve the administration of justice; and
(g) for such other programs for the benefit of the public as are specifically
approved by the Court from time to time." '
The plan adopted by the court is embodied in a new section of the
Integration Rule." 7 This new section provides that an attorney may establish a trust savings account in any bank or savings and loan association
that meets certain criteria."' Since clients' funds must be subject to immediate withdrawal, deposits may not be made in any institution that has
enforced its right to require a thirty or sixty-day notice within the last five
years."' Once funds are deposited in an eligible depository, if that institution exercises its right to require notice, the institution becomes ineligible,
and attorneys whose trust savings accounts are affected must immediately
notify the Florida Bar Foundation."' If, in the interval before the funds can
be withdrawn, a client demands his funds, the rule further provides that
an attorney may certify to the Foundation the sum needed to meet the
client's emergency needs."' The Foundation, at its discretion, may then
See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule art. XII (West 1967). The court's order also required
the board of directors of the Foundation to be expanded to include as permanent board
members the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, two other judicial officers, the
president of the Florida Bar, and the chairman of Florida Legal Services, Inc. See In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 811 (Fla. 1978).
Furthermore, the court ordered the charter of the Foundation to be changed to reflect the
purposes of the plan. See id. at 811.
145. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
805 (Fla. 1978). Florida Legal Services, Inc. is a nonprofit operation that organizes and funds
legal service programs for the poor throughout Florida. See id. at 805 n.34.
146. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 811
(Fla. 1978).
147. See id. at 809-11. Various other amendments made to the Integration Rule and Code
of Professional Responsibility authorized attorneys to deposit trust funds with savings and
loan associations, a function previously reserved only to banks. See id. at 807-09.
148. See id. at 809 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(i)). The institution may
be one authorized by either state or federal law but must be insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. See id. at 809.
149. See id. at 809 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(ii)).
150. See id. at 809 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iii)).
151. See id. at 809 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)).
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advance to the attorney funds to meet all or part of the client's emergency
needs.' 52 If an advance is made, the attorney must direct the institution
holding his client's funds to remit to the Foundation an amount equal to
the advance as soon as the deposit may be withdrawn.15 The rule also
requires that the trust savings accounts earn a rate of interest that is equal
to or exceeds the rate paid on regular savings accounts.'' Eligible depository institutions are to calculate interest on the deposits based on the
"average monthly balance" and remit such interest directly to the Foundation.'"
Attorneys electing this program are further required to mail to each
client for whom they hold trust funds a copy of a notice given in the rule.5 56
The notice explains why attorneys place certain trust funds in demand
deposits and why a client cannot expect to earn interest on small, shortterm trusts.' t It informs the client, however, how his funds can be used to
help satisfy the objectives of the court's plan."' The form stipulates that
the client's funds will be placed in an interest-bearing trust account with
interest accruing to the Foundation, unless he "specifically" gives his attorney "written instructions to the contrary."' 55 The notice further explains
that if the client chooses not to permit his funds to be placed in a trust
savings account for the benefit of the Foundation, his funds will be placed
in demand deposits from which he will not realize any income.8 0

A CRrrcICSM OF THE FLORIDA PLAN
Due Process
It is well-settled that the state cannot take private property without
affording the owner both procedural and substantive due process.", At first
152. See id. at 809-10 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)(A)).
153. See id. at 810 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)(B)).
154. See id. at 810 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(v)).
155. See id. at 810 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vi)(A)).
156. See id. at 810 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vii)).
157. See id. at 810-11 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vii)).
158. See id. at 811 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vii)).
159. See id. at 811 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vii)).
160. See id. at 811 (to be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(vii)).
161. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971) (substantive); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (procedural); Keating v.
State ex rel. Ausebel, 173 So. 2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1965) (substantive and procedural). See
generally U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Procedural due process
requires that a person must be given notice of the proceeding against him, that he must be
given an opportunity to defend himself, and that the propriety of the deprivation must be
resolved in a manner consistent with fairness. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950). Substantive due process may be defined generally as the

constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property for
arbitrary reasons, whether by unreasonable legislation, or legislation unreasonably applied.

See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1885).
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reading the order of the Florida Supreme Court may appear to conflict with
these constitutional guarantees, as clients are denied the right to earn
interest for their own benefit from their small, short-term trust accounts." 2
To assert a due process claim, a client would have to show that he possessed a specific property right6 3 and that he, in fact, had been unjustly
deprived of such property right.'"' The immediate question, however, of a
due process violation concerning the Florida plan is averted because the
plan requires an attorney to obtain his client's consent before the client's
funds can be placed in savings accounts for the benefit of various legal
programs.'
The plan, however, is still open to serious constitutional question. Although an individual may waive many of his constitutional rights, 66 such
a waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently' and will
not be presumed by the courts.' The method under the Florida plan by
which attorneys are to obtain their clients' consent or waiver is difficult to
reconcile with the principle of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver.' ,The court assumes that a client has knowingly waived his constitutional right to due process simply because he was mailed a rather vague
162. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
811 (Fla. 1978).
163. See New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 88 (1891). Property
rights extend beyond the mere "thing" and include the rights to acquire, use, and dispose of
property. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60, 74 (1917).
164. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (wages unjustly
deprived when frozen in garnishment proceedings); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928) (unjust deprivation of right to devote land to
legitimate use); Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1926) (unjust deprivation of
earnings from proceeds of land wrongfully confiscated and sold).
165. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
810-11 (Fla. 1978).
166. See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972) (rights to
prejudgment notice and hearing); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
315-16 (1964) (rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment); Evans v. Hillsborough
County, 186 So. 193, 196 (Fla. 1938) (right to challenge statute depriving individual of real
property).
167. See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
168. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949) (privilege against selfincrimination); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (right to trial by jury);
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (right to object to actions
of administrative agencies).
169. Compare In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d
799, 810-11 (Fla. 1978) (notice mailed by attorney to client and no objection thereto by client
assumed to be waiver) with D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972)
(waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently) and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) (courts do not presume waiver of constitutional rights).
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notice, and he has not objected. "' There is no requirement of showing that
the client even received the notice,' and, therefore, no basis whatsoever
for holding that a client voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights to due process.' Furthermore, the notice does not warn of the
73
possibility that a client could not obtain all of his funds upon demand.
In addition, the notice gives the client no guidelines by which he could
judge whether the size and longevity of his trust entitle him to the earnings
of the trust."' In fact, the notice implies that a client has only two choices:
to place his funds in a savings accounts for the benefit of unknown proor to place the funds in a
grams "designed to benefit the general public,"
7
non-interest-bearing trust checking account. '
To insure that a client has made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver, several changes should be made. The notice should be expanded
to identify all of the client's rights as a trustor and beneficiary. It should
give the client guidelines by which to judge whether his trust is large
enough to be invested economically for his benefit. Furthermore, the notice
should warn the client that there is a possibility, although very small, that
he could not obtain all his funds on demand.'. Finally, use of the client's
funds should be prohibited until the attorney receives from his client a
signed waiver that includes a statement that the client knowingly, volun170. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
807, 810-11 (Fla. 1978).
171. See id. at 810-11. A return receipt is not even required. See id. at 810-11.
172. If, in fact, a court has no evidence that an individual is knowledgeable of his rights,
it is certainly difficult to argue that such individual voluntarily and intelligently waived his
rights. Furthermore, the court, as indicated by the notice it prescribed, must assume without
justification that the client is aware of a trustee's duty to invest the funds of the trust for the
maximum benefit of the beneficiaries or trustors, for it does not advise the client of this
important fact. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So.
2d 799, 810-11 (Fla. 1978).
173. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
810-11 (Fla. 1978). If the institution where the trust savings account is deposited exercises
its right to require a thirty or sixty-day notice of withdrawal, there is no guarantee that the
client will receive all his money upon demand during the reserve period. See id. at 809-10 (to
be codified in Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)). An attorney may request funds to satisfy the
client's emergency needs, but whether the request will be honored in full depends upon the
rules and limitations imposed by the Foundation. See id. at 810 (to be codified in Integration
Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)(c)). The notice, therefore, is misleading because it states that an attorney must keep a client's funds "available for immediate withdrawal," when in fact such funds
may not be available upon demand. See id. at 810.
174. See id. at 810-11.
175. See id. at 810.
176. A person cannot waive a right of which he has no knowledge. Andre v. Resor, 313
F. Supp. 957, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 443 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1971); see D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972) (implied that waiver of property right
must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464-65 (1938) (whether waiver of right to counsel made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly depends upon circumstances of each case).
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tarily, and intelligently authorizes his trust funds to be invested for the
benefit of the organized bar.'
Conflicts of Interest
Although opponents contend that the Florida plan creates a conflict with
ethical standards prohibiting an attorney from benefiting from the investment of a client's funds," 8 no specific conflicts are identified.' It is difficult to understand how an attorney could benefit directly from his client's
funds since he has no right to the principal or the interest of the trust.8 "
An attorney might benefit indirectly, however, from the Florida plan and
his client's funds, if the plan alleviated the need for him to pay greater dues
to the Florida Bar for support of bar programs and the clients' security
fund, or if he received payments from Florida Legal Services, Inc. for
providing legal services.' 8' It is doubtful, however, that the Florida Bar
Integration Rule and Code of Professional Responsibility will be construed
so narrowly, as prior actions against attorneys under these rules have been
limited to situations in which clients' funds were appropriated for use by
attorneys.' 2 Ironically, it may be the attorney not participating in the
Florida plan who does benefit directly from his clients' trust funds. For
177. If the question of waiver is ever litigated, the burden of proof will be on the party
asserting that a valid waiver has been made. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96
(1972); Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
White, 429 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (N.D. Miss. 1977). If for no other reason than to protect an
attorney and ease his burden of proof, a signed waiver including the statement should be
added.
178. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
805 (Fla. 1978). Three law firms and the Florida Bankers Association contested the adoption
of the plan. See id. at 799.
179. See id. at 805. See generally Brief in Response to Petition at 6, In re Interest on
Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978); Letter from Henry
P. Trawick, Jr. to Taylor S. Boone (Sept. 6, 1978).
180. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
181. Earnings from clients' funds are to support a number of bar programs, such as
grievance committee operations and the augmentation of the clients' security fund. See In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 805, 811 (Fa. 1978).
It is through innovations such as these that the attorneys can further the ethical standards
of improving the legal system and of making legal counsel available. See generally FLA. STAT.
ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons 2 & 8 (West Supp. 1968-1978).
182. The many law suits and opinions by the various bar associations concern situations
in which an attorney has realized, or can realize a direct economic benefit from his clients'
funds. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Bright, 165 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. 1964) (borrowing and
pledging clients' trust funds for collateral warranted attorney's suspension); AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, 1975 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR AssOcIATION ETHics OPINIONS, No. 8157
(1972 FLA. Ops. 36) (placing clients' trust funds in certificates of deposit to reimburse law
firm for expense of administering trust prohibited); AMERiCAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR AssocIATIoN ETHics OPINIONS, No. 5979 (6 Amz. B.J. 36 (1970))
(depositing clients' funds in savings account in attorney's own name and for his own use
prohibited without clients' prior consent).
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example, prior to the time that the plan in Alberta, Canada was made
mandatory, attorneys received free bank services from banks if they deposited clients' non-interest-bearing trust funds.'" The important point is
that care should be taken to insure that the earnings from clients' trust
funds are not used in a manner that would appear to benefit attorneys
directly. 8' The plan should emphasize programs that benefit the general
public directly, such as legal aid and the clients' security fund, and to a
lesser extent programs that appear to aid attorneys, such as funding legal
libraries and subsidizing programs of continuing professional education."'
DetailedReview of the New Plan Embodied in IntegrationRule 11.02(4)(d)
An analysis of the Florida plan would not be complete without a close
inspection of subsections of Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d) and their possible
ramifications. Subsection (ii) of the rule provides that a bank or savings
and loan association may not be a recipient of savings trust accounts, if
during the past five years it has exercised its rights to require a thirty or
sixty-day notice of withdrawal. 8 ' No explanation appears in the case before the Florida Supreme Court for choosing a period of five years.' In
addition, there is no indication whether the banks in Florida regularly
exercise their right to notice."S If, in fact, it is a common procedure for
banks to require notice, the plan may effectively eliminate most of the
banks in Florida as depositories for clients' trust accounts. Assuming that
exercise of the right to notice is not common, subsection (ii), nevertheless,
precludes any bank from participating in the plan solely because such
bank exercised its right within the five year period before the Florida
Supreme Court made its order establishing qualifications.' Although it is
understandable that the bar and the court would desire the greatest assurance that a bank would not exercise its right to notice, it is questionable
for a court to promulgate a regulation that appears retroactive." It would
183. See Sadownik, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 20 CHrrrv's L.J. 149, 149

(1972).
184. See Robertson, The Law Foundation, 27 ADVOCATE 264, 265 (1969).
185. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9 (West
Supp. 1968-1978) ("A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety").
Although it can be argued that justice will be better served by providing attorneys with better
libraries and refresher courses, it can also be argued that such actions could be misunderstood
by the public and could lower the public confidence in the legal system and legal profession.
See generally id.; Robertson, The Law Foundation,27 ADVOCATE 264, 265 (1969).
186. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
809 (Fla. 1978). Compare 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(2)(1978) (thirty days for federal banks) with
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 654.02 (West 1966) (sixty days for state banks).
187. See generally In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356
So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
188. See generally id.
.189. See id. at 809.
190. Cf. McCord v. Smith, 43 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 1949) (retroactive provision of
legislative act is invalid when additional disabilities are established concerning prior acts).
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be much more reasonable and would provide greater security if an attorney
were required to contract with a bank to waive its right to notice.", Even
though the court's order cannot be considered ex post facto,"I adoption of
the contract method would eliminate any argument by a bank that the
order was invalid for creating a disability concerning the bank's prior exer3
cise of its right."1
Subsection (iv) may create a conflict with other sections within the
Integration Rule and the Code of Professional Responsibility." 4 Under both
of these official guides, an attorney must repay a client's funds held in trust
upon demand," 5 but under the Florida plan embodied in Rule 11.02(4)(d)
it is possible that a client could not obtain all his funds upon demand."'
Although subsection (iv) is an attempt to insure that an attorney can
always repay a client upon demand, it is remiss for two reasons. First,
subsection (iv) (A) provides that the Foundation may advance an attorney
only the amount of money necessary to meet the client's emergency
needs."' Consequently, a conflict may arise since Disciplinary Rule 9The United States Constitution and many state constitutions include no express prohibition
of civil laws that are retrospective. See, e.g., Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
242 (1912); Ross v. Board of Sup'rs, 104 N.W. 506, 508 (Iowa 1905); Gorham v. Robinson,
186 A. 832, 852 (R.I. 1936). See generally FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 10. Nevertheless, in the states
that may pass retroactive legislation, statutes may not be enacted that impair contractual
obligations or vested property rights. See McCord v. Smith, 43 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 1949);
Gorham v. Robinson, 186 A. 832, 852 (R.I. 1936). See generally Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S.
511, 519 (1885). Other states, however, specifically prohibit retroactive laws in their constitutions. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 20; TEx. CONST. art 1, § 16.
191. A federal bank may, by contract, waive its right to the thirty-day notice of withdrawal. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(2)(1978). If a bank made such a waiver, it would also have
to waive its right to notice from all other depositors who are subject to the same remaining
contractual provisions as in the case of the attorney. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(a)(1978). Apparently, state banks under Florida law would not be precluded from waiving their right to a
sixty-day notice. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 654.02 (West 1966).
192. Ex post facto prohibitions apply only to penal statutes or orders. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390
(1798); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir.
1977).
193. Cf. McCord v. Smith, 43 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 1949) (retroactive provision of
legislative act invalid when additional disabilities established concerning prior acts).
194. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv) (West Supp. 1968-1978)
(as ordered in In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
809-10 (Fla. 1978)) (attorney may request funds to meet client's emergency needs and Foundation may pay) with id. Rule 11.02(4) (attorney shall deliver all client's funds upon demand)
and FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(B)(4) (West Supp.
1968-1978) (lawyers must promptly pay client his funds).
195. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(B)(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
196. See note 173 supra.
197. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)(A) (West Supp. 1968-1978) (as
ordered in In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 809
(Fla. 1978)).
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102(B)(4) requires an attorney to make full repayment upon demand." 8
Second, even if the emergency needs of a client equalled his entire deposit,
subsection (iv)(C) might nevertheless prevent a client from collecting all
of his funds upon demand, since the subsection enables the board of directors of the Foundation to establish a withdrawal limit.' While the two
conflicts may seldom arise, they point out that an attorney could find
himself in violation of Integration Rule 11.02(4) and Disciplinary Rule 9102(B)(4). 2 Since attorneys electing to participate in the Florida plan are
not exempted from any cause of action for failing to return all of a client's
money upon demand,"' they might be subject to an action for conversion
brought by an injured client."2
Also subject to question is subsection (iv)(B), requiring an attorney to
order the applicable bank to pay the Foundation directly an amount equal
to the advance made to the attorney by the Foundation to meet his client's
emergency needs. Federal banking regulations prohibit withdrawals from
a savings account by payment to anyone but the depositor. 23 These regulations, however, are subject to a number of exceptions, two of which appear
applicable to the Florida plan."1' First, if the advance made by the Foundation is considered an extension of credit to the attorney, the trust savings
198. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(B)(4) (West
Supp. 1968-1978). The same conflict exists within Florida's existing integration rule. In FLA.
STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978), an attorney must deliver
money held in trust upon demand, with the exception of funds upon which exist a valid lien
for his services, and a failure to make such a delivery is considered a conversion. It might
well be argued that the Florida plan under Rule 11:02(4)(d) qualifies the attorney's more
general obligation to make repayment upon demand, but the crux of this discussion is to point
out where problems might arise, if for no other reason than vagueness. This problem could
have been avoided if the court had specified explicitly whether the Florida plan was an
exception to the general rule and if it had amended Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(4).
199. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d)(iv)(C) (West Supp. 1968-1978) (as
ordered in In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 810
(Fla. 1978)). The maximum the board might establish could possibly be below a client's
emergency needs and deposits.
200. See FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN., Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102(B)(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978).
201. Compare FtA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d) (West Supp. 1968-1978) (as
ordered in In re Interest on Trust Accounts, a Petition of the Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799,
809-10 (Fla. 1978)) (no exemption specified) with Legal Assistance Act, Queensl. Stat. No.
67, sec. 10(2)(a), at 910 (1965), as amended by Queensl. Stat. No. 46, sec. 3(c)(1970) (exemption provided in Queensland, Australia) and Legal Profession Amendment Act, Alta. Stat.
c. 114, sec. 7, § 109(2), at 489 (1972) (amending ALTA. Rav. STAT. c. 203 (1970)) (exemption
provided in Alberta, Canada).
202. See FtA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4) (West Supp. 1968-1978) (refusal to
deliver money upon demand deemed a conversion). Attorneys, in lieu of defending an action
of conversion, could always draw upon their own funds and later collect from the bank. That
action, however, may not be available depending upon the size of the client's deposits and
the attorney's wealth and credit.
203. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(1) (1978).
204. See id. § 217.5(c)(1)(iii) & (vii).
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account could be considered a security, and the payment from such account enabling the Foundation to realize upon its security would be a
permissible practice. 05 The second exception would be one authorizing a
bank to make payment to a third party pursuant to a non-transferable
withdrawal order or authorization from the depositor. 00 Given these two
exceptions to the general rule, there should be no question of the validity
of the subsection (iv)(B).
CONCLUSION

The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a concept that the organized
bar of each state should explore and seriously consider promoting. The
concept provides that clients' trust funds that cannot be economically
invested for the benefit of clients and that would otherwise remain in noninterest-bearing accounts may be deposited in trust savings accounts to
earn interest for the benefit of the organized bar. A number of Australian
states and Canadian provinces have for some time authorized the use of
clients' non-interest-bearing trust funds to support public legal programs.
A review of the plans operating in both countries will provide an excellent
background for understanding the plan adopted in Florida. The Florida
plan is innovative and well worth copying in many respects. The plan,
however, is not above question in certain aspects such as the manner of
determining which banks are eligible to participate and the manner in
which clients may waive their due process rights to the possession and use
of their property. Consequently, bar associations considering adoption of
the Florida plan may find it beneficial to explore alternatives some of
which have been suggested in this comment.
205. See id. § 217.5(c)(1)(iii).
206. See id. § 217.5(c)(1)(vii).
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